

The background of the entire page is a network diagram consisting of light teal lines connecting various circular nodes. The nodes are scattered across the page, creating a web-like structure. The word "RESOLVE" is written in a large, bold, dark teal font at the top left, with "NETWORK" in a smaller, all-caps, dark teal font directly below it. A thin, dark teal diagonal line is positioned to the right of the word "RESOLVE".

**RESOLVE**  
NETWORK

# Conducting P/CVE Assessment in Conflict Environments: Key Considerations

Colin P. Clarke

---

RESOLVE NETWORK | APRIL 2020  
*Researching Violent Extremism Series*  
<https://doi.org/10.37805/rve2020.3>

# ABSTRACT

This chapter provides guidance for those conducting research to assess initiatives aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in conflict environments. This chapter will provide an overview and background of P/CVE assessment and, using the case of Afghanistan as an illustrative example, present some of the key challenges and opportunities inherent in them, particularly those conducted in conflict zones. The chapter then discusses some of the key considerations that those embarking on an assessment should keep in mind when designing and implementing their studies, as well as potential workarounds to some of the more significant issues and recommendations for those conducting assessments or embarking on similar studies.

# INTRODUCTION

The whole notion of P/CVE remains somewhat controversial in policy, academic, and government circles. This has especially been the case in the United States (U.S.).<sup>1</sup> Some have even derided P/CVE efforts as a “cottage industry” notable for the “lack of any workable recommendations it produced.”<sup>2</sup> Untold sums of money have been poured into these efforts, distributed with little oversight to a range of stakeholders, some of which lack the backgrounds and skills necessary to effectively measure the efforts they purport to work. Few would debate that P/CVE is difficult, especially because this type of programming is often ill-defined and risks overly securitizing the issues and populations it is meant to address.<sup>3</sup> To avoid the misallocation of funds, or worse, interventions that are actually harmful in the environments they are implemented, however, it is essential to carry out P/CVE assessments. This is even more vital in areas that are or have recently experienced active conflict—where the negative ramifications of ill-suited P/CVE programs can be even greater.

Carrying out P/CVE assessments, however, is no simple task, even in the best of circumstances. In areas of heightened risk—including areas experiencing active or recent conflict, violence, tension, and fragility—the challenges facing assessors are even more difficult to mitigate. Using Afghanistan as an illustrative example, this chapter discusses the added importance of P/CVE assessments in high-risk environments and provides an overview of key considerations, challenges and opportunities, and recommendations for those seeking to conduct, use, or learn from them.

---

1 James Zogby, “CVE in the US: More Harm Than Good,” *Huffington Post*, July 24, 2016, [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cve-in-the-us-more-harm-t\\_b\\_7868180](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cve-in-the-us-more-harm-t_b_7868180).

2 Kim Ghattas, “Talking Loud and Saying Nothing,” *Foreign Policy*, August 4, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/04/four-problems-with-obama-countering-violent-extremism-cve-isis/>.

3 Chris Bosley, *Injecting Humanity: Community-Focused Responses for People Exiting Violent Extremist Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/08/injecting-humanity-community-focused-responses-people-exiting-violent>.

# THE ASSESSMENT IMPERATIVE: MEASURING AND EVALUATING P/CVE EFFORTS

P/CVE assessment—defined here as the measurement and evaluation of efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism—provide necessary information on the overall effectiveness of P/CVE programs and mechanisms.<sup>4</sup> This information is essential in helping scholars, practitioners, and policymakers gain a better understanding of what works and what does not when it comes to efforts to address violent extremism, craft best practices and lessons learned, and identify potential opportunities for more effective policy and programs.

The necessity of conducting rigorous assessments, however, is not without challenges—be they from the donor, analytic, or related to access, safety, data availability (and reliability) and local capacity.<sup>5</sup> In some cases, the donors themselves can be an obstacle, either discounting the importance of assessment or lacking the understanding to appreciate how critical assessment is in the overall design of the program. Unfortunately, for some, **doing something** is considered good enough, while assessing actual impact is disregarded as too difficult, costly, or inconvenient. When assessment is considered a mere afterthought or ignored entirely, the result is often a research design that mislabels the phenomena it purports to measure, and thus reaches conclusions that are often disputed, disparaged, or worse, blatantly false.

Taking stock of these challenges, while also laying out realistic and pragmatic benchmarks toward progress, are part of a bevy of important considerations to take into consideration when designing the assessment component of a P/CVE program, particularly those involving analysis of human attitudes, behaviors, and relationships. These considerations are even more important in conflict environments,<sup>6</sup> where the challenges can be heightened, as can be the risks associated with bad or counterproductive P/CVE programming. Afghanistan’s experience with P/CVE efforts illustrates some of these heightened challenges and the importance of planning strategies to mitigate them when carrying out P/CVE assessments.

## AFGHANISTAN AND P/CVE ASSESSMENT

In some ways, Afghanistan is the ideal laboratory for measuring the efficacy of P/CVE programs. A country suffering from more than three decades of continuous civil war and insurgency, Afghanistan had long been plagued by violent extremist conflict. Some of Afghanistan’s most salient drivers of violent

---

4 For more on this, see: Todd C. Helmus, et al., *RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2017), <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html>.

5 Georgia Holmer and Peter Bauman with Kateira Aryaeinejad, *Measuring Up: Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programming* (United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 8–10, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/measuring-monitoring-and-evaluating-pcve-programs>.

6 See, for example: Luke Kelly, *Lessons Learned from Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Programmes Amid Ongoing Conflict*, K4D Helpdesk Report 668 (Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2019), [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db80ed1e5274a4aa423ea2d/668\\_lessons\\_from\\_CVE.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db80ed1e5274a4aa423ea2d/668_lessons_from_CVE.pdf).

extremism are thought to be grievances stemming from frustrations over physical insecurity, government corruption, poverty, and growing income inequality.<sup>7</sup> As one of the poorest countries in the world—ravaged by ongoing, decades-long conflict, high levels of unemployment, and scarce socioeconomic opportunity for its overwhelmingly young population<sup>8</sup>—the prospects for future extremism and radicalization in Afghanistan could be immense, and the potential implications dire. Reporting suggests that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has capitalized on some of these dynamics, paying Afghans as much as \$500 per month to fight on behalf of the group, an attractive salary for would-be fighters.<sup>9</sup>

## P/CVE Efforts in Afghanistan

While Afghanistan has a long track record with P/CVE research and programming, it has not always been a successful one. Beginning around 2012, following more than a decade of relentless counterinsurgency operations, both the U.S. and British governments began investing more resources into the emerging concept of P/CVE in Afghanistan. Funding was dedicated toward a range of initiatives, including media messaging, interfaith religious dialogue, and an Afghan-centric P/CVE policy that was supposed to account for local context and culturally-specific indicators that could be tailored to Afghanistan's unique ethnic landscape specifically. While these initiatives sound promising, they have largely been “conducted in a ‘siloed’ fashion, with donors independently funding initiatives without a coherent approach...what research does exist is often the proprietary information of either NATO or embassies, and is not shared, perhaps ironically, for security purposes.”<sup>10</sup>

In late 2015, the Afghan government began its own P/CVE strategy, an initiative undertaken by Afghanistan's Office of the National Security Council (ONSC). Efforts by the ONSC were complemented by assistance offered from a range of other stakeholders, including provincial leaders, an inter-ministerial working group, and members of the Afghan media.<sup>11</sup> P/CVE programs in the country, however, have historically been initiated from the top-down, with consultation from religious leaders, village elders, prominent politicians, and other elites on program design and metrics for success.<sup>12</sup> The primary beneficiaries of and populations affected by these programs, it seems, have no say in their design or implementation. What is

---

7 Marisa L. Porges, “Radicalization Processes in Afghanistan,” *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 1 (2012), <https://ctc.usma.edu/radicalization-processes-in-afghanistan/>.

8 Afghanistan's demographic composition is of particular note—more than half of the population (about 55%) is under 25 years old, while three-quarters is under 35. For more, see: MercyCorps, *Does Youth Employment Build Stability? Evidence from an Impact Evaluation of Vocational Training in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: MercyCorps, 2015), [https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps\\_AfghanistanINVEST\\_ImpactEvaluation\\_2015.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps_AfghanistanINVEST_ImpactEvaluation_2015.pdf).

9 Dawood Azami, “Why Taliban Special Forces are Fighting the Islamic State,” *BBC News*, December 18, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35123748>.

10 Eliza Urwin, “Everyday CVE Indicators: A Case Study from Afghanistan,” in *Contemporary P/CVE Research and Practice*, eds. Lilah El Sayed and Jamal Barnes (Hedayah and Edith Cowan University, 2017), 244–60, <https://s3-eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/hedayah-wp-offload/hedayah/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/17114200/File-222018131552.pdf>.

11 Counter Extremism Project (CEP), *Afghanistan: Extremism & Counter-Extremism* (CEP, 2020), 27, [https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country\\_pdf/AF-04082020.pdf](https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/AF-04082020.pdf).

12 Eliza Urwin and Belquis Ahmadi, *Measuring Peace and Violent Extremism: Voices from an Afghan Village* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2018), 244, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/pb244-measuring-peace-and-violent-extremism-voices-from-the-afghan-village.pdf>.

more, while the focus of P/CVE programming in the country is nearly always on the violence perpetrated by the Taliban and other violent non-state actors, corruption plays a significant role in Afghans' collective grievances, and is cited by some as their most pressing grievance when compared to others.<sup>13</sup> The Taliban's propaganda and messaging frequently highlight government corruption and use this as a tool to radicalize and recruit new members into its organization.<sup>14</sup>

Top-down and government-led P/CVE strategies, therefore, may not always be the most effective means of addressing violent extremism and could risk furthering already present grievances. This, coupled with the heightened consequences of implementing counterproductive programming in the midst of ongoing conflicts in the country, further underscores the necessity of conducting P/CVE assessments to understand the context and ensure that P/CVE programs are addressing violent extremism, rather than contributing to it. It also underscores some of the difficulties and potential pressures facing such assessments.

## Challenges to P/CVE Assessment in Afghanistan

Beyond the analytical issues that plague P/CVE assessments in general, in Afghanistan, which has been subjected to active conflict for decades, additional and potentially more dire issues face the measurement and evaluation of P/CVE efforts. As in other conflict settings, issues associated with the safety and security of researchers and research participants, access to reliable information, and the necessary resources and expertise further complicate assessment efforts in the country.

Frequent attacks and flare-ups of violence pose numerous safety and security issues for researchers, as do hostile attitudes toward journalists, media workers, researchers, and others who seek to collect and analyze data related to P/CVE and terrorist organizations.<sup>15</sup> Afghanistan, in particular, has been an unsafe environment for researchers and journalists. In 2018 alone, an especially dangerous year, thirteen journalists were killed in the country.<sup>16</sup> Security concerns have also limited a number of studies and research projects (not just those limited to P/CVE), as well as the locations permissible for data collection to only a few select provinces and territories.<sup>17</sup> Recent developments related to the U.S.-Taliban peace deal may only exacerbate ongoing security risks, making the medium-to-long term prospects for stability in Afghanistan extremely tenuous.<sup>18</sup> This makes the prospect of conducting P/CVE research a particularly

---

13 Porges, "Radicalization Processes in Afghanistan."

14 Reza Fazli, Casey Johnson, and Peyton Cooke, *Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2015), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR379-Understanding-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism-in-Afghanistan.pdf>.

15 Such hostilities are not unique to the case of Afghanistan. For more, see: J.M. Berger, *Researching Violent Extremism: The State of Play* (Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2019), 9, <https://resolvenet.org/research/researching-violent-extremism-state-play>.

16 "Journalists Killed in Afghanistan Since 1992," *Committee to Protect Journalists*, <https://cpj.org/asia/afghanistan/>.

17 For just one example, see: Sara Pavanello, *Multi-purpose Cash and Sectoral Outcomes*, (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018), <https://www.unhcr.org/5b2cfab97.pdf>.

18 David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "A Secret Accord with the Taliban: When and How the U.S. Would Leave Afghanistan," *New York Times*, March 8, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-annexes-peace-agreement.html>.

precarious endeavor for scholars, academics, and policy practitioners, with implications for the availability, reliability, and type of data collected, and, therefore, the quality of the assessment.

Conflict aside, there are other challenges to conducting P/CVE programs in Afghanistan, including low literacy rates, the tendency to spread news by word-of-mouth and the lack of resources to confirm whether rumors have validity or are altogether false.

## P/CVE ASSESSMENTS: SOME KEY CONSIDERATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

While it is important to remain sober about the litany of challenges in P/CVE assessment in and outside of active conflict zones, it is perhaps even more critical to be able to recognize and take advantage of any opportunities or workarounds that present themselves throughout the process. Drawing on examples from the Afghanistan case study above, as well as the author's own experience, the guidelines and considerations below outline important areas of focus for those seeking to conduct P/CVE assessments in conflict—and even non-conflict—environments, be it Afghanistan or elsewhere. The considerations guide readers through key areas throughout the assessment process and provide a framework for those embarking on these studies. While the list is not exhaustive, it does provide readers with a starting point and key questions to consider.

### Understand the Environment

#### **SITUATE THE ASSESSMENT IN AN OTHERWISE CROWDED FIELD**

As P/CVE efforts have received greater attention and funding over the past several years, they have multiplied significantly. This multiplication in P/CVE activities poses potential issues, but also potential opportunities. With more actors seeking to conduct P/CVE initiatives and research, there are more opportunities for redundancy, a lack of standardization both within and across disciplines, and the exacerbation of programmatic or research “fatigue” amongst P/CVE participants—where participants are included in P/CVE efforts or studies too frequently, adversely impacting their response rates and potentially contributing to response bias or decreased validity. A potentially positive outgrowth of having multiple entities conducting P/CVE assessments, however, is that different actors may very well be collecting different kinds of data and/or concerned with measuring or evaluating different target audiences or local populations. Multiple organizations can also lead to competition, which, in turn, can reduce cost and improve quality, at least over the long-term. No organization should dominate the market on P/CVE assessment; however, the very nature of operating in a conflict zone or post-conflict environment requires special skill sets, adequate resources, and access to potentially valuable data.

This also opens the possibility of discerning a multi-layered view of dynamics related to terrorism and insurgency, including who supports it and why. A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), for example, delves into micro-level detail on selected individual-level motivators related to

individuals that joined the Afghan Taliban.<sup>19</sup> The categories delineated in the report include adventure, belonging, status, revenge, a fear of being targeted by other violent extremist entities, and material enticements, which provide useful information and a possible example for others, including those looking to conduct assessments, to follow.<sup>20</sup> As an additional example, according to a report titled *A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda*, in terms of available literature on P/CVE interventions according to country, there are 16 reports on Afghanistan, tied with Indonesia for the most of any non-Western country.<sup>21</sup> While this number highlights quantity with no sense of overall quality of these reports, what it does indicate is that organizations and firms have figured out how to overcome many of the challenges of operating in Afghanistan to conduct their work.

Importantly, assessors should also map out relevant, but non-P/CVE-focused activities that may have useful insights on the context or the assessment process. The international community has a longer track record and greater experience with programs similar to P/CVE, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. In contrast to P/CVE, many DDR programs have taken the shape of peacebuilding processes conducted at the level of group behavior and dynamics where cooperation is incentivized through the removal or mitigation of punitive measures.<sup>22</sup> Some scholars and practitioners have argued that P/CVE and DDR have quite a lot in common, and perhaps a hybrid approach borrowing from each and focused on conflict prevention could be one way to achieve a breakthrough in the field.<sup>23</sup> While a breakthrough might be overstating the case, there could be useful lessons learned, particularly when examining past failed efforts at DDR in **specific** cases and focusing on these lessons to discern both challenges and opportunities.

Overall, understanding what work has or is already being done in a specific country context can greatly supplement or inform individual assessment efforts, both in terms of additional data and in terms of the potential to share best assessment practices in otherwise difficult conflict environments.

---

19 James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, *Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation*, RUSI Whitehall Report 2-16 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2016), [https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608\\_cve\\_and\\_rr.combined.online4.pdf](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf).

20 Ibid.

21 The report notes that the top three countries for reports are, in order, the United Kingdom (54), the United States (22) and Australia (16). See: Eric Rosand et al., *A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda* (The Prevention Project and Royal United Services Institute, 2018), [https://organizingagainstve.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GCCS\\_ROADMAP\\_FNL.pdf](https://organizingagainstve.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GCCS_ROADMAP_FNL.pdf).

22 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, "The Blue Flag in the Grey Zones: Exploring the Relationships between Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in UN Field Operations," in *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?*, eds. James Cockayne and Siobhan O'Neil (New York: United Nations University, 2015), 67.

23 Dean Piedmont, *The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Countering Violent Extremism*, (Zurich: ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies, 2015), <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/192304/pdf>.

## Considerations for assessors:

- What additional work is being conducted in a similar context?
- How is other work related to my own research?
- Is it possible to obtain further information or insight on others' work?
- How is the other work related to or possibly affecting the assessment in question?
- What lessons and best practices from others can be used, learned from, and adapted?
- Is it possible or beneficial to collaborate with other actors working in this context?

## PAY ATTENTION TO THE CONFLICT CURVE

Where a location is on the conflict curve<sup>24</sup> can exacerbate assessment challenges. In post-conflict areas, trauma, continued insecurity, and an ebb in resources from the international community and external donors—many of whom have likely moved on to focus on other conflicts with more media attention and perceived urgency—can increase assessment difficulties.

Those carrying out assessments in areas likely to experience, currently experiencing, or that have recently experienced conflict must adopt and maintain **conflict sensitivity** in their approach. Conflict sensitivity is not solely conscribed to recognizing where a population or area lies on the conflict curve. Rather, conflict sensitivity requires active recognition of and attempts to understand the contexts in which they operate with the understanding that even well-intended external interventions can lead to unintended consequences, including counterproductive second- and third-order effects. Indeed, even the presence of the researcher can impact conflict and community dynamics in unanticipated ways. Being conflict sensitive, therefore, requires active self-reflection and the creation of one or multiple mitigation plans to deal with any potential fallout exacerbated by any negative impacts that might arise.<sup>25</sup>

There are also other, more practical and predictable challenges to conducting P/CVE assessments in conflict zones. For example, the contact information of potential participants may change, or it may be difficult to locate individuals that participated in earlier iterations of a study who may have either moved voluntarily or been forced to move because of deteriorating security conditions on the ground. As discussed in the example of Afghanistan above, rampant violence and countrywide instability have driven

---

24 For more on the conflict curve, see: "Curve of Conflict," United States Institute of Peace, accessed April 20, 2020: <https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict>.

25 United Nations Development Group, *Conducting a Conflict and Development Analysis* (United Nations Development Group, 2016), 113, [https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/UNDP\\_CDA-Report\\_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf](https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/UNDP_CDA-Report_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf).

migration—individuals who may have taken part in the early stages of a P/CVE intervention might not be available to complete the study, thus complicating the sample size and associated results.<sup>26</sup>

### Considerations for assessors:

- What does conflict look like in the area of study?
- How does conflict affect the methods that can be employed?
- What does that mean for personal safety and security of both assessors and eventual beneficiaries?
- How could the presence of the individual researcher or the P/CVE program itself negatively impact or contribute to conflict dynamics?
- What can be done to account for and measure second- and third-order consequences?
- What are the range of viable contingency plans available?

## Assess Possible Measures and Methods

Given the trillions of dollars spent on military and security-focused operations of the so-called Global War on Terrorism, a profound shift in thinking has occurred over the past five years. The concept of P/CVE transcends numerous sectors and does not fit squarely in any one particular field, including terrorism studies. This means that P/CVE assessments need to pay attention to the factors they are trying to assess and the methods they can use to do so.

Among the most important properties to consider when designing a P/CVE program assessment is specifying the way in which the results will (or will not) enable causal inference regarding the outputs, outcomes, or impacts of the effort. Overall, the most effective designs will be valid, generalizable, practical, and, above all else, useful for policymakers at multiple levels.<sup>27</sup> Still, tensions and tradeoffs always exist when prioritizing objectives.

Researchers focused on methodology, assessment design, and program evaluation have a significant role to play in advancing the science underpinning this field, which continues to grow ever more crowded

---

26 Tuesday Reitano and Peter Tinti, *Reviewing the Evidence Base on Migration and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)* (CT MORSE, 2017), <http://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/EU-CVE-Migration-.pdf>.

27 Research designs that are valid measure what they are intended to measure; generalizable designs may be extended beyond the initial sample to a broader population; practical designs will take into account the multiple constraints of a particular context; and those that are useful will offer concrete recommendations for policymakers in this field.

as governments and civil society organizations struggle to prevent conflict before it starts, and as more funding is allocated toward this and ancillary objectives.

## PINPOINT THE PHENOMENA BEING MEASURED

A particular problem plaguing assessments is the issue of the so-called “dogs that don’t bark,” or in other words, how does one appropriately account for the absence of something rather than its presence. The overarching challenge is “isolating the variables that might be correlated to a decline in extremist violence.”<sup>28</sup> Without knowing this, it can be difficult to tell if P/CVE programs are effective, or if other exogenous factors play a more significant role in the outcome, especially in environments in which violent conflict is pervasive. Moreover, not all individuals who radicalize commit acts of violence, so merely looking at a decline in violent attacks could present a distorted picture of trends in extremism in a given country.<sup>29</sup>

An additional issue to consider is what are you measuring. Unfortunately, in P/CVE assessments, there is often a lack of sophistication surrounding the subject. Developing a clear theory of change and measurable variables can help to improve this issue; however, when those variables include indicators such as “courses held” or “individuals trained” as metrics of success in and of themselves, the meaning behind a theory of change is lost. Counting is not measurement, evaluation, or assessment and should not be portrayed as such.

There are also certain categories of questions that are more likely than others to elicit dishonest responses, especially subjects including “support for militant groups,” inevitable to arise in any P/CVE pre- or post-assessment.<sup>30</sup> In terms of data collection, when interviews are complemented by primary and/or secondary source data, there are also considerations that the data itself could include “a number of biases, inaccuracies limited data collection priorities, and coding differentials.”<sup>31</sup> One of the ways to increase rigor in P/CVE assessments is to forge a closer working relationship with the academics, who often develop the tools to measure impact, and the local practitioners working in the field, who have the knowledge to contextualize findings within the cultural and community context.<sup>32</sup>

When conceptualizing how to prevent or counter violent extremism, there are myriad layers to consider—the extremist him/herself, their family members, the broader community, and a range of other stakeholders. This should be viewed as more of an opportunity than as something onerous, as it affords

---

28 Georgia Holmer, *Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR336-Countering%20Violent%20Extremism-A%20Peacebuilding%20Perspective.pdf>.

29 Holmer, *Countering Violent Extremism*.

30 There are a number of innovative survey methodologies that promise to improve the validity of measurements by reducing non-response and social desirability biases. See: Graeme Blair, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, “Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan,” *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014): 1043–63, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12086>; see also: Bryn Rosenfeld, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “An Empirical Validation Study of Popular Survey Methodologies for Sensitive Questions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (2016): 783–802, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12205>.

31 Joe Whittaker, *Building Secondary Source Databases on Violent Extremism: Reflections and Suggestions* (Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2019), 6, <https://resolvenet.org/research/building-secondary-source-databases-violent-extremism-reflections-and-suggestions>.

32 Holmer, Bauman, with Aryaeinejad, *Measuring Up*, 10.

policymakers the chance to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the many levers at play when considering the nuanced nature of extremism and radicalization. One study by the United Nations, for example, found that while Taliban fighters numbered in the thousands, the numbers of youth who were unemployed, frustrated with their situations, and marginalized in Afghan society was upwards of several times that number.<sup>33</sup> This shows that there is a much larger reservoir for potential supporters of terrorist organizations, far beyond those under arms or actively fighting with the Taliban or similar militant groups. Assessors need to think through and operationalize not only the phenomena they are seeking to measure or evaluate, but also consider how it interacts or could be affected by the broader context, which, in conflict environments, requires further understanding of broader conflict dynamics.

### Considerations for assessors:

- Spend significant effort and resources defining the scope of a P/CVE program, which can help avoid the trap of attempting to measure too wide a range of variables.
- What is the theory of change?
- What is the assessment actually trying to measure?
- What variables have others used to measure this same phenomenon?
- What are the confounding variables and how might these be mitigated?

## MATCH YOUR METHODS TO THE CONTEXT

Not all assessments are simple. **Where** the assessment takes place will have a significant impact on the challenges it presents and its feasibility. This is particularly so with regard to the research methods employed in the assessment itself. Some analytical techniques that might be feasible and applicable when assessing workplace initiatives in New York City, for example, are far less feasible in conflict zones, which present an array of complex challenges to data collectors and researchers. P/CVE assessments take many forms, but, given their area of focus, tend to take place in areas either on the cusp of, actively engaged in, or just recovering from violent conflict.

This, in turn, requires that the assessor understand the environment in which they are conducting their study. Local or tribal environments, even those not currently experiencing conflict, for example, could very well prove inimical to techniques such as social network analysis, especially if the environment

---

33 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “DDR in the Context of Offensive Military Operations, Counterterrorism, CVE, and Non-Permissive Environments,” in *UN DDR In an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose?*, eds. James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil (New York: United Nations University, 2015), 44, [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un\\_ddr\\_in\\_an\\_era\\_of\\_violent\\_extremism.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_ddr_in_an_era_of_violent_extremism.pdf).

consists of many individuals who use colloquial names, a lack of record keeping, and non-existent procedures to verify an individual's identity and other important demographic indicators.

The risk of survey or research fatigue, noted above, is something that should be considered during the design phase of an assessment. Those conducting assessments should ensure that there is a proper balance struck between data collection and inundating the respondent with too many questions. Doing so will help in avoiding situations in which respondents, tired of responding, provide any answer, no matter its veracity, just to finish the assessment as quickly as possible. Of course, this phenomenon is not unique to P/CVE—it is a risk when conducting other types of survey or evaluation work as well, in both combat and non-combat zones.<sup>34</sup>

### Considerations for assessors:

- Recognize the limitations of certain social science methods in conflict zones and avoid “cherry picking” methods from other sectors that can lead to additional errors.
- On which population(s) does the assessment focus?
- What are the cultural considerations to keep in mind?
- Are there limits to which methods can be used? If so, what are these limits?
- What are the challenges to obtaining the information needed?
- Are there significant constraints on movement and how will those impact the study?
- What other studies are running in parallel? What can be done to avoid “survey fatigue”?

## CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS ON VALIDITY

Graeme Blair et al. offer practical advice from field work in Afghanistan, stressing the importance of engaging in multiple pretests and focus groups in the areas to be sampled, as geography can be a significant determinant of levels of formal education and, thus, research approaches.<sup>35</sup> The authors found that Kabul and its immediate environs, while convenient, could produce a skewed and unrepresentative sample of Afghan society more broadly.<sup>36</sup>

---

34 Christopher Paul et al., *Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR800/RR809z2/RAND\\_RR809z2.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR809z2/RAND_RR809z2.pdf).

35 Blair, Imai, and Lyall, “Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments.”

36 Ibid.

This is true beyond just Afghanistan, although for different reasons. Focus groups can be useful in understanding the demographics of certain segments of the population, while also being useful in the design, execution, and assessment of the results of the evaluation.

Where focus groups are the primary method of data collection, they should be moderated by a trained expert, recorded (if culturally permissible), and composed along the lines of a previously agreed-upon interview protocols. In certain settings, it may make the most sense to structure focus groups according to specific demographic categories—gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, or religion—as this could help pre-empt situations in which socially or culturally bestowed honorifics influence how participants respond. This is particularly important in a setting like Afghanistan, where tribal elders could dominate the discussion, or where women’s roles may be marginalized or excluded altogether.

Because a given focus group is composed of a particular demographic cross-section, it has low external validity and cannot be generalized to the population at large. Because of this, researchers should also seek to convene multiple focus groups to capture differences between groups. In conflict environments, snowball sampling has often proven to be an acceptable and feasible option and a method that can be aided by local NGO partners. Focus groups can also be used to provide greater context for “surprising survey results” or to aid in confirming correlations.<sup>37</sup>

### **Considerations for assessors:**

- Consider the impact that geography has on variables such as education, which will be directly related to the focus group members’ ability to understand research approaches.
- Make sure focus groups are moderated by a trained expert and recorded (if culturally permissible).
- Structure focus groups according to specific demographic categories in order to pre-empt cumbersome socio-cultural mores that could limit certain participants’ responses.

## **CAREFULLY SELECT FACILITATORS**

Who conducts the assessment matters. Facilitators are critical to the smooth functioning of research broadly and focus groups specifically. Facilitators must be able to understand a range of important issues, both socially and culturally, but also with respect to how to be an effective interlocutor. A facilitator’s ability to manage and mitigate tendencies toward groupthink, the presence of a dominant or intimidat-

---

37 Matthew Nanes and Bryony Lau, *Surveys and Violent Extremism: A Practitioner Guide* (The Asia Foundation, 2018), 51, <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Surveys-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf>.

ing participant, and other issues that can ruin an interview session will increase the chances of successful data capture.

To the extent it is possible, one-on-one interviews are preferred over focus groups to get a better sense of what the respondent truly feels based on their own individual experiences. These interviews can mitigate challenges associated with groupthink and unseen pressures to conform to social norms, particularly prevalent in areas within a country like Afghanistan where tribes, clans, and sects hold outsized sway.

Beyond payments and the role played by facilitators, the development of local research capacity and training in P/CVE evaluation can make the difference between whether a study succeeds or fails. If facilitators can operate autonomously and without constant oversight from other research team members, locals can drive the conversation. This, in turn, can increase the credibility of the study, free from the skewed conversations that might result with foreigners present or observing the back-and-forth.

### **Considerations for assessors:**

- Focus on selecting the right facilitators, especially those who can understand a range of cultural and societal nuances and serve as an effective interlocutor.
- One-on-one interviews should be prioritized over focus groups to get a better sense of what the respondent truly feels based on their own individual experiences.
- Develop local research capacity and training in P/CVE evaluations, which can be difficult in the short term but pay huge dividends over time.

## Facilitate Information Sharing

### **BUILD IN MECHANISMS TO SHARE ASSESSMENT FINDINGS**

While immensely beneficial, in some cases, information on ongoing initiatives or their findings may not always be publicly available. When it comes to the many programs and studies on P/CVE in Afghanistan, for example, there remains a general lack of transparency—organizations or entities conducting programs or assessments have little visibility on similar, duplicative, or even complementary efforts occurring elsewhere in the country. Even if these organizations have been able to overcome some of the obstacles inherent to P/CVE work in the country, it is unclear just how many have and how they did so.

In fact, some researchers conducting P/CVE assessments in conflict zones do not want their work to be published, because they fear a critique of their sample size, methodology, overall research design or

other related aspects of their work. If follow-on funding depends on demonstrating success, however loosely defined, there are serious risks that firms will be reluctant to circulate any findings to the contrary. This prevents follow-on academic research that could ultimately help refine and improve the process. There may also be ethical reasons for refusing to publish results, or there may be serious concerns over what entity is funding the research and for what purpose. Assessors should consider their own restrictions to information sharing and consider alternative mechanisms for sharing their findings in an ethical and safe manner.

### **Considerations for assessors:**

- What is the most effective means of socializing findings from the assessment?
- Will the findings from the assessment be made public?
- Are there any special considerations that would prohibit all or any part of the findings from public dissemination?
- If the findings cannot be shared broadly, is there any way to anonymize the data in the findings sufficiently to enable some type of knowledge exchange with other stakeholders?

## **BUILD RAPPORT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES**

There are lessons that can be learned from organizations working in conflict zones. Even if these organizations are not specifically working on P/CVE assessments, they still have experience partnering with local entities to make an impact in reducing violence. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of many of these violence reduction initiatives and can provide an in-depth overview of some of the challenges and opportunities its staff have encountered in a range of conflict settings around the globe.<sup>38</sup>

Bringing government and non-government entities together in the same space to work on P/CVE can build rapport over time as well as person-to-person relationships that might be critical in navigating organizational bureaucracies, particularly in conflict environments. This applies not only to Western governments, non-governmental organizations, and civil society organizations operating on the ground, but also to local populations and elements of the local or state government in which the assessment is taking place. Working with civil society organizations can also serve to strengthen assessment findings and to “reduce suspicion of the state and so act as a CVE mechanism”<sup>39</sup> in and of itself. According to the Global

---

38 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles Into Practice* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2011), [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pdacs400.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf).

39 Fazli, Johnson, and Cooke, *Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan*, 14.

Counter Terrorism Forum, “a range of actors, including civil society, (e.g., international and local partners, NGOs, religious organizations, universities, and communities) might be encouraged to take part in these efforts and this could be addressed within the appropriate legal and/or policy framework.”<sup>40</sup>

Rosand and Skellett agree, noting that “sub-national authorities” can serve as a link between national government and civil society actors and in the process, help to facilitate both bottom-up and top-down information sharing related to P/CVE issues.<sup>41</sup>

### Considerations for assessors:

- What expertise or access is needed to conduct the assessment?
- What government and non-government actors might be interested in the assessment?
- How can I vet partners and partner organizations wishing to participate in the assessment or access its findings?
- Are there any risks to broadening involvement?

## Plan but Adapt

P/CVE assessments, especially when conducted in conflict zones, often require adjustments to plans or research design “on the fly”, or in stride. To mitigate disruptions, it is important for the program administrators and implementation teams to understand and plan for risk, which will likely necessitate regular risk management throughout the project cycle.<sup>42</sup> As J.M. Berger has observed, one of the most significant barriers to designing a comprehensive P/CVE program is defining its scope, especially as these programs can attempt to measure a wide range of variables, often too many.<sup>43</sup>

40 Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), *Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism* (GCTF, 2013), [https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19\\_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf](https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf).

41 Eric Rosand and Rebecca Skellett, “Connecting the Dots: Strengthening National-Local Collaboration in Addressing Violent Extremism,” *Lawfare*, October 21, 2018, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/connecting-dots-strengthening-national-local-collaboration-addressing-violent-extremism>.

42 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Improving the Impact of Preventing Violent Extremism Programming: A Toolkit for Design, Monitoring and Evaluation* (Oslo: UNDP, 2018), 9, [https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo\\_governance\\_centre/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html](https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo_governance_centre/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html).

43 J.M. Berger, *Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption* (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 2016), <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf>.

When conducting P/CVE assessment in conflict zones, it is crucial that, to the extent possible, the research team is both nimble and responsive. These are more than mere buzz words and can significantly impact how the assessment or evaluation is executed. In conflict environments, researchers need to remain flexible and willing to seize the opportunity to gather data wherever and however they can in what is often a rapidly changing environment.

The more non-permissive an environment becomes, the more stakeholders will want access to data, which often leads to poor data, gathered and analyzed expediently.<sup>44</sup> There are clear limitations to the use of social science methods in combat and tribal environments, and attempting to “cherry pick” methods from private industry, including advertising, public relations, and marketing, can lead to additional errors. In some conflict environments, particularly those with austere communications infrastructures such as Yemen, Somalia, or Afghanistan, it can also be challenging to stay in contact with respondents. Those engaging in P/CVE assessments should develop plans for dealing with this and the flexibility they need—both in terms of their research and their donor’s demands—to address these issues as they arise.

### **Considerations for assessors:**

- Understand and plan for risk by constantly revisiting risk management models and matrices throughout the project cycle.
- Remain nimble and responsive in order to seize any opportunities to gather data in a rapidly changing environment.

## CONCLUSION

Rigor and resources are the two conflicting forces in designing assessment. These two forces must be balanced with utility, but assessment design should be tailored to the needs of stakeholders and end users in order to add value. In 2020, there are myriad organizations attempting to conduct P/CVE assessments (definitions will vary widely) in conflict and post-conflict environments. These efforts often come at a high cost for program sponsors and assessment design suffers when it fails to account for local sensitivities, socio-cultural conditions, and the overall security environment. To the extent possible, P/CVE efforts

---

<sup>44</sup> Some populations reside in what can best be described as “denied environments,” not just because of the dangers posed to researchers by violent extremists and terrorist organizations, but from authoritarian governments that want to prevent researchers from publishing studies on these subjects.

should view these interventions as a longer-term relationship that involves the transfer of teachable skills rather than a one-time operation to solve a problem.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the influx of resources over the past several years to fund research and programming related to P/CVE, there are still enormous challenges for researchers who seek to conduct a rigorous assessment of P/CVE mechanisms, especially in countries that lack both the will and capabilities to carry out these types of evaluations.<sup>46</sup> By taking into consideration some of the questions and suggestions outlined in this chapter, researchers and practitioners can gain a better understanding of the challenges that lie ahead and prepare for them to the best extent possible.

---

45 Holmer, *Countering Violent Extremism*.

46 Stevan Weine and Eric Rosand, "Repatriating ISIS Families: An Opportunity to Show that 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' Can Work," *Just Security*, June 14, 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/64567/repatriating-isis-families-an-opportunity-to-show-that-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-can-work/>.

# SOURCES

- Azami, Dawood. "Why Taliban Special Forces are Fighting the Islamic State." *BBC News*, December 18, 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35123748>.
- Berger, J.M. *Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption*. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2016. <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf>.
- . *Researching Violent Extremism: The State of Play*. Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2019. <https://resolvenet.org/research/researching-violent-extremism-state-play>.
- Blair, Graeme, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall. "Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014): 1043–63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12086>.
- Bosley, Chris. *Injecting Humanity: Community-Focused Responses for People Exiting Violent Extremist Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/08/injecting-humanity-community-focused-responses-people-exiting-violent>.
- Chowdhury Fink, Naureen. "The Blue Flag in the Grey Zones: Exploring the Relationships between Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in UN Field Operations." In *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?*, edited by James Cockayne and Siobhan O'Neil, 62–79. New York: United Nations University, 2015.
- Counter Extremism Project (CEP). *Afghanistan: Extremism & Counter-Extremism*. CEP, 2020. [https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country\\_pdf/AF-04082020.pdf](https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/AF-04082020.pdf).
- Fazli, Reza, Casey Johnson, and Peyton Cooke. *Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2015. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR379-Understanding-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism-in-Afghanistan.pdf>.
- Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "DDR in the Context of Offensive Military Operations, Counterterrorism, CVE, and Non-Permissive Environments." In *UN DDR In an Era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose?*, edited by James Cockayne and Siobhan O'Neil, 36–62. New York: United Nations University, 2015. [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un\\_ddd\\_in\\_an\\_era\\_of\\_violent\\_extremism.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_ddd_in_an_era_of_violent_extremism.pdf).
- Ghattas, Kim. "Talking Loud and Saying Nothing." *Foreign Policy*, August 4, 2015. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/04/four-problems-with-obama-countering-violent-extremism-cve-isis/>.
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). *Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism*. GCTF, 2013. [https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19\\_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf](https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf).
- Helmus, Todd C., Miriam Matthews, Rajeev Ramchand, Sina Beaghey, David Stebbins, Amanda Kadlec, Michael A. Brown, Aaron Kofner, and Joie D. Acosta. *RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism*. Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html>.
- Holmer, Georgia. *Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2013. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR336-Countering%20Violent%20Extremism-A%20Peacebuilding%20Perspective.pdf>.
- Holmer, Georgia, Peter Bauman, with Kateira Aryaeinejad. *Measuring Up: Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programming*. United States Institute of Peace, 2018. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/measuring-monitoring-and-evaluating-pcve-programs>.
- "Journalists Killed in Afghanistan Since 1992." *Committee to Protect Journalists*. <https://cpj.org/asia/afghanistan/>.
- Kelly, Luke. *Lessons Learned from Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Programmes Amid Ongoing Conflict*, K4D Helpdesk Report 668. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2019. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db80ed1e5274a4aa423ea2d/668\\_lessons\\_from\\_CVE.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db80ed1e5274a4aa423ea2d/668_lessons_from_CVE.pdf).
- Khalil, James, and Martine Zeuthen. *Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation*, RUSI Whitehall Report 2-16. London: Royal United Services Institute, 2016. [https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608\\_cve\\_and\\_rr.combined.online4.pdf](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160608_cve_and_rr.combined.online4.pdf).
- MercyCorps. *Does Youth Employment Build Stability? Evidence from an Impact Evaluation of Vocational Training in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: MercyCorps, 2015. [https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps\\_AfghanistanINVEST\\_ImpactEvaluation\\_2015.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps_AfghanistanINVEST_ImpactEvaluation_2015.pdf).
- Nanes, Matthew, and Bryony Lau. *Surveys and Violent Extremism: A Practitioner Guide*. The Asia Foundation, 2018. <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Surveys-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf>.
- Paul, Christopher, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala. *Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR800/RR809z2/RAND\\_RR809z2.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR809z2/RAND_RR809z2.pdf).
- Pavanello, Sara. *Multi-purpose Cash and Sectoral Outcomes*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018. <https://www.unhcr.org/5b2cfab97.pdf>.
- Piedmont, Dean. *The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Countering Violent Extremism*. Zurich: ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies, 2015. <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/192304/pdf>.
- Porges, Marisa L. "Radicalization Processes in Afghanistan." *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 1 (2012). <https://ctc.usma.edu/radicalization-processes-in-afghanistan/>.

- Reitano, Tuesday, and Peter Tinti. Reviewing the Evidence Base on Migration and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). *CT MORSE*, 2017. <http://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/EU-CVE-Migration-.pdf>.
- Rosand, Eric, and Rebecca Skillett. "Connecting the Dots: Strengthening National-Local Collaboration in Addressing Violent Extremism." *Lawfare*, October 21, 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/connecting-dots-strengthening-national-local-collaboration-addressing-violent-extremism>.
- Rosand, Eric, Emily Winterbotham, Michael Jones, and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi. *A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda*. The Prevention Project and Royal United Services Institute, 2018. [https://organizingagainste.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GCCS\\_ROADMAP\\_FNL.pdf](https://organizingagainste.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GCCS_ROADMAP_FNL.pdf).
- Rosenfeld, Bryn, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "An Empirical Validation Study of Popular Survey Methodologies for Sensitive Questions." *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (2016): 783–802. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12205>.
- Sanger, David E., Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. "A Secret Accord with the Taliban: When and How the U.S. Would Leave Afghanistan." *New York Times*, March 8, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-annexes-peace-agreement.html>.
- United Nations Development Group. *Conducting a Conflict and Development Analysis*. United Nations Development Group, 2016. [https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/UNDP\\_CDA-Report\\_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf](https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/UNDP_CDA-Report_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf).
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Improving the Impact of Preventing Violent Extremism Programming: A Toolkit for Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*. Oslo: UNDP, 2018. [https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo\\_governance\\_centre/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html](https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo_governance_centre/improving-the-impact-of-preventing-violent-extremism-programming.html).
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID). *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice*. Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pdacs400.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf).
- Urwin, Eliza. "Everyday CVE Indicators: A Case Study from Afghanistan." In *Contemporary P/CVE Research and Practice*, edited by Lilah El Sayed and Jamal Barnes, 244–60. Hedayah and Edith Cowan University, 2017. <https://s3-eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/hedayah-wp-offload/hedayah/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/171114200/File-222018131552.pdf>.
- Urwin, Eliza, and Belquis Ahmadi. *Measuring Peace and Violent Extremism: Voices from an Afghan Village*. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2018. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/pb244-measuring-peace-and-violent-extremism-voices-from-the-afghan-village.pdf>.
- Weine, Stevan, and Eric Rosand. "Repatriating ISIS Families: An Opportunity to Show that 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' Can Work." *Just Security*, June 14, 2019. <https://www.justsecurity.org/64567/repatriating-isis-families-an-opportunity-to-show-that-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-can-work/>.
- Whittaker, Joe. *Building Secondary Source Databases on Violent Extremism: Reflections and Suggestions*. Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network, 2019. <https://www.resolve.net.org/research/building-secondary-source-databases-violent-extremism-reflections-and-suggestions>.
- Zogby, James. "CVE in the US: More Harm Than Good." *Huffington Post*, July 24, 2016. [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cve-in-the-us-more-harm-t\\_b\\_7868180](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cve-in-the-us-more-harm-t_b_7868180).

## RESOLVE NETWORK

better research • informed practice • improved policy on violent extremism •

[www.resolvenet.org](http://www.resolvenet.org)



RESOLVE is housed at the U.S. Institute of Peace, building upon the Institute's decades-long legacy of deep engagement in conflict affected communities.



**UNITED STATES  
INSTITUTE OF PEACE**  
Making Peace Possible

# RESOLVE

NETWORK



UNITED STATES  
INSTITUTE OF PEACE  
Making Peace Possible