

# Consensus vs. Complexity: Challenges of Adaptability for the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Framework & the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

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## KEY FINDINGS

- **The United Nations' (UN) counter-terrorism (CT) framework has been established in an era of massive expansion for CT response.** Following the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and other significant attacks in Europe and around the world, the Western-led, global response to al-Qaida and then ISIS/Daesh – first with the US-led “Global War on Terror” (“GWOT”) and then the Global Coalition against Daesh – was framed as a justifiable response to the exceptional problem of Islamist extremism.
- **Over the last two decades, a transnational approach to CT has developed within the global governance arena,** such as through the mechanism of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. While these CT frameworks might be ideologically agnostic in their language, the context driving their formation encourages practices and policy interpretations developed under them to be myopically focused on this single form of terrorism and violent extremism (T/VE).
- **While the UN CT framework provides a structure within which international agreement could be consolidated** on the Islamist threat, the implementation of it is not sufficiently nimble to allow for nuanced conversations about different types of terrorist and violent extremist threats, let alone to ensure learning on one type of ideological threat and response informs conversations about other types.
- **A case study of this phenomenon can be seen in the UNSC approach to the inclusion of gender perspective and women in the CT framework.** The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda – first elaborated in 2000 with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and since further developed with nine subsequent resolutions – represents the extent to which the UNSC has been able to integrate gendered analysis and perspective into its CT work, most notably through UNSCR 2242 (2015).
- **The WPS agenda has largely focused on the impact of conflict on women (and girls, in some cases) and has encouraged increased participation of women in peace and security solutions, including CT – reflecting the impacts of terrorism on women and girls.** However, CT policy and programming must account for the socio-cultural gender norms that impact how and why all individuals engage with T/VE.
- **The intersections of WPS and CT have taken place within the context of exceptional focus on Islamist extremism,** due to the fact that the WPS agenda has developed concurrently with international focus on the threat of al-Qaida and then ISIS/Daesh. The lack of shared learning across different silos of gender research and response focused on other ideologies has led to missed opportunities to exchange and expand the gender perspectives and analytical tools which inform gender mainstreaming strategies within UNSC and wider UN CT policy – ultimately, leaving the policy less adaptable across the expanding threat spectrum.

# INTRODUCTION

This research brief examines the adaptability and transferability of the last two decades of United Nations' (UN) counter-terrorism (CT) legal and policy frameworks and architecture to the evolving threat landscape. Due to the context of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and other significant attacks in Europe and around the world carried out by transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS/Daesh), the modern conception of CT has expanded around the globe through CT focused responses such as the "Global War on Terror" ("GWOT") and the efforts of the Global Coalition against Daesh. There has been a significant proliferation of transnational CT responses over the last two decades, including the mobilization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the wider UN to develop a CT policy framework, with a predominant implementation focus on Islamist extremism. However, while the threat remains from the likes of al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, and affiliates, the threat spectrum continues to develop and other ideologically motivated forms of terrorism and violent extremism (T/VE) are evolving as secondary and even primary threats in some parts of the world.<sup>2</sup> Thus, an examination of adaptability and transferability of UN CT frameworks across threat profiles is needed.

UN CT policies are challenged by the emergence and resurgence of different threat profiles on the security horizon because its response framework is focused on one type of T/VE threat. As there is increasing focus on the threat of extreme right-wing T/VE in the current social and political context in the West, for example, the challenges of adaptability and transferability become apparent. This is often due to the lack of flexibility and nuance of the conversation around CT at the UN level. This same lack of consideration for complexity can be exemplified through the case of the UNSC's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda and the subsequent application of gender mainstreaming strategies.

The WPS agenda was introduced with UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000 and developed over the next two decades with the adoption of nine follow-on resolutions.<sup>3</sup> The increasing visibility of the impacts of terrorist groups on women and girls, and the articulation by some groups of a strategy that specifically targeted gender equality or utilized narratives promoting the subjugation of women, created greater momentum to push for the integration of the WPS and CT agendas, reflected most significantly in UNSCR 2242. However, even with this necessary focus on the protection and empowerment of women in the peace and security space, there has often been a more limited policy conversation around the wider gender perspective and analysis needed to effectively implement gender mainstreaming strategies. There needs to be increased attention given to understanding how socio-culturally defined gender roles and expectations impact how and why every individual engages with T/VE. Additionally, research is needed on how the wider gender equality goal of gender mainstreaming strategies can be implemented

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1 United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).

2 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTED), "Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism," *CTED*, 2020. Available at: [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED\\_Trends\\_Alert\\_Extreme\\_Right-Wing\\_Terrorism.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism.pdf), accessed on: April 11, 2022.

3 UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).



and contribute to the effectiveness of CT policy and programming. This exemplifies how the lack of consideration for complexity and the lack of knowledge sharing can negatively impact the evidence base from which to design effective CT policies.

## ANALYSIS

### Context of Consensus on the UNSC CT Framework

The UNSC mobilization around the international threat of transnational Islamist terrorist organizations has included a series of evolving resolutions building up a UNSC CT framework on T/VE going back to UNSCR 1269 in 1999, expressing concern about the increasing number of international terrorist attacks. These resolutions, starting with UNSCR 1373 (2001), follow the evolving post-9/11 context of the U.S.-led coalition military campaigns against al-Qaida and then the Global Coalition response to ISIS/Daesh. The first time a consensus could be reached more widely among UN Member States (MS) on a common approach to CT occurred in 2006 with the adoption of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) by the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This UNGCTS is designed with four pillars as a foundation:

- Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism
- Preventing and Combatting Terrorism
- Building States' Capacity and Strengthening the Role of the United Nations
- Ensuring Human Rights and the Rule of Law

This structure – with some pillars emphasizing law enforcement or legal responses and some more preventative approaches – has continued to guide the biennial review of the strategy, which allows for updates and improvements attuned to the changing CT priorities of the MS since its original 2006 adoption. While this resolution and its subsequent updates are not binding, it does encourage governments worldwide to abide by a central set of principles.

The language of these UN CT frameworks is ideologically blind. For example, UNSCR 1624 (2005), which expanded UNSC condemnation from acts of terrorism to also include the incitement and/or glorification of terrorist attacks, indicates that this irrespective of their motivation. By approaching it in this very generalized way, UN CT frameworks have allowed for the building up of alliances and coalition approaches around the pursuit of terrorist organizations, opening the door for intelligence sharing and cooperation. However, in practice, this mobilization of effort on CT has been almost singularly focused on the threat of Islamist T/VE. For example, UNSCRs 2178 (2014), which first addresses the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), and 2396 (2017), which urges the increasing of tools in this fight to stem the flow of FTFs, are practically only addressing the issue of individuals leaving to fight in the context of joining ISIS/Daesh, al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, etc.

While global consensus has largely been reached, at least at the high-policy level, around the threat of al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, and affiliates, there remains a lack of consensus around threats posed by other terrorist actors. This lack of consensus is manifest in the long-standing inability of UN MS to agree on a common definition of terrorism. This poses several fundamental challenges to the adaptation and transferability of these policy resolutions and tools across the threat spectrum, especially as the focus in resolutions has shifted from terrorist acts to a focus on terrorism. For example, the increasing threat of extreme right-wing terrorism and even its transnational nature have been noted by the UN CT Executive Directorate.<sup>4</sup> However, this remains a contested issue at multiple levels and is often complicated by the undefined nature of T/VE. The fact that the concepts of radicalization and VE have become common policy terms in the context of global CT efforts over the last two decades, which have been focused on Islamist extremism, has often led to oversimplification of their definition and effective synonymization with Islamist ideology.<sup>5</sup>

While the more recent UNSCR 2617 (2021) reaffirms “that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations,” there has not been such unified agreement within the UNSC or wider UN on whether/if any other forms of T/VE represent a threat to international peace and security. While there has been some compromise in the defining language with: “all forms of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, including those on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief,” it is clear when looking back at the UN CT frameworks formed over the last two decades that they have been elaborated with one specific threat in mind. The consensus over the level of threat of al-Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh was reached while avoiding more nuanced exploration of T/VE in all its forms and discussions over the “growing and increasingly transnational threat of extreme right-wing terrorism” remain contentious as to the level of threat it poses.<sup>6</sup>

Following the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and other significant attacks in Europe and around the world, the Western-led, global response to al-Qaida and then ISIS/Daesh – first with the U.S.-led “GWOT” and then the efforts of the Global Coalition against Daesh – was framed as a justifiable response to an exceptional problem. However, conducive conditions for terrorist organizations have long been connected with an array of “unexceptional” conflict and instability drivers, as can be seen in the areas of the globe still suffering from the highest number of deaths from terrorist attacks today.<sup>7</sup> The Global Terrorism Index

4 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTED), “Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism,” *CTED*, 2020. Available at: [https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED\\_Trends\\_Alert\\_Extreme\\_Right-Wing\\_Terrorism.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism.pdf), accessed on: April 11, 2022.

5 Elizabeth Pearson, Emily Winterbotham, and Katherine Brown, *Countering Violent Extremism: Making Gender Matter* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Arun Kundnani, *The Muslims are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror* (Verso, 2014); Floris Vermeulen, “Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (2014): 286-306. doi:10.1080/09546553.2012.705254. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.705254>.

6 UNCTED, “Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism.”

7 Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” *IEP*, 2022. Available at: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web.pdf>, accessed on: April 11, 2022.

confirms that structural issues such as poor governance, socio-economic, and human rights conditions are all common themes in areas of the world where the highest number of deaths from terrorist attacks still take place, such as Africa and South Asia.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, CT approaches need to be considered less exceptional and instead more attention should be given to the wider socio-economic and political environments that can lead to and support the presence of organized terrorist groups.

With UNSCR 2178 (2014), the UNSC formally recognized that “‘violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism’, requires collective efforts, ‘including preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters’”.<sup>9</sup> This preventative pillar was further developed with the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which was released in 2015, partly as a UN contribution to the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. While the UNGA did not formally accept this document, the plan has become commonly referenced by multiple UN agencies. However, the development of preventative CT policy (often described as P/CVE programming) has also occurred within the wider context of focus on Islamist extremism. This leaves a question as to whether these UNSCR and UNGCTS frameworks – despite their inclusion of stock language about applying to terrorism “in all forms and manifestations” – are appropriate for addressing all forms of T/VE, as consensus engagement on the development of CT policy through the UNSC has not been successful in considering other ideological motivations of T/VE, let alone ensuring that learning around one form of T/VE informs conversations about the other forms.

## Challenges of Complexity for the WPS Agenda

Gender mainstreaming offers a case study of the challenges within the UNSC consensus system in developing the nuance and complexity required to curate learning across perspectives in support of effective response across threat profiles. Introduced with UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the WPS agenda has been the main vehicle for implementation of gender mainstreaming approaches into global peace and security policy. There are now 10 resolutions calling for the equal inclusion of women in policy and programming, as well as the consideration of gendered impacts of security policy.<sup>10</sup> There are four pillars of the WPS agenda: Participation, Prevention, Protection, and Relief and Recovery. These pillars cover a wide range of conflict situations in which women need to be granted more proportional attention. The following are the key provisions of UNSCR 1325:

- Increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making.
- Attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict.

8 Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism.”

9 UN Women, “Statement by UN Women on the Adoption of Security Council Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security,” *UN Women*, 2015, p. 2. Available at: <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/ed-statement-UNSC-resolution-1325>, accessed on: April 12, 2022.

10 UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).

- Gender perspective in post-conflict processes.
- Gender perspective in UN programming, reporting, and in SC missions.
- Gender perspective & training in UN peace support operations.

While there has been significant agreement and commitment at the policy level to the WPS agenda, there often remain deep inequalities within the security system and significant gaps between policy commitments and on-the-ground implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies.<sup>11</sup> WPS commitments have encouraged increased participation of women in some security spaces from which they were previously barred. However, they have also sometimes led to the harmful securitization of wider women's rights agendas, by linking them to CT, P/CVE, and the security agenda rather than acknowledging them as a basic human right (e.g., by linking women's rights to CT program implementation, it can encourage local resistance to this being an imposed, foreign security agenda rather equality being a basic human right the country has subscribed to, etc.). WPS commitments have also encouraged, in some cases, homogenization and essentialization of women in the context of transnational programming, by linking demand with limited gender analysis. Largely due to the historically gender-blind nature of the security arena, there is a significant lack of gender data with which to build the evidence base for the importance and design of transformative gender mainstreaming strategies that avoid potential harms.

UNSCR 2242 (2015) called on all UN MS to more strongly link their WPS, CT, and P/CVE agendas in order to more effectively counter terrorism and its root causes, creating a normative and narrative link between women's rights, security, and CT and P/CVE. However, there remains a common lack of institutional commitment to gender mainstreaming policy goals at the national and international levels, with implementation often falling short of policy commitments. This can be due to multiple factors, including the gendered nature of the institutions themselves and the institutions within the MS that make up the UN, as well as a lack of understanding or personal commitment among those responsible for policy to the feminist principles of gender mainstreaming and analysis.<sup>12</sup> Even though there is policy reinforcement around the importance of gender equality and the empowerment of women (e.g., through UNSCRs 1325 and 2242), a more comprehensive understanding of gender is required, as well as more data on if and how gender inequality can drive participation in VE.<sup>13</sup>

As the multidimensional nature of gender remains a controversial subject and the UNSC is dependent upon consensus, the agenda was originally contained to WPS (rather than Gender, Peace, and Security) and has often been limited to focus on empowering the roles of women, rather than wider consideration

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11 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai, "A Man's World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism," *Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security*, 2016. Available at: <https://www.globalcenter.org/publications/a-mans-world-exploring-the-roles-of-women-in-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism/>, accessed on: April 14, 2022.

12 Rosalind Cavaghan, *Making gender equality happen: Knowledge, change and resistance in EU gender mainstreaming* (Routledge, 2017).

13 Melissa Johnston and Jacqui True, "Misogyny & Violent Extremism: Implications for Preventing Violent Extremism," *UN Women*, 2019. Available at: <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/10/misogyny-violent-extremism>, accessed on: April 11, 2022.



of the nuance of multidimensional gender perspective.<sup>14</sup> The focus on inclusion of women through the WPS agenda has sometimes been used as a policy excuse to exclude the wider gender perspective (e.g., analysis of how socio-culturally constructed roles impact all individuals) needed to improve effectiveness and transferability of CT policy, as well as the consideration of where gender perspective intersects with other points of identity that should also be considered. The limited scope of consideration has also commonly resulted in the equation of “gender” within CT policy with women and has sometimes homogenized and essentialized women into roles as mothers, wives, and peacemakers.<sup>15</sup>

To enhance the effectiveness of UN CT policy, it should account for the ways in which gender impacts the radicalization of all individuals, as well as how they can be effective in the fight against T/VE.<sup>16</sup> Without institutional commitment and increased understanding of the complexity of gender, it becomes very easy to side-step gender equality goals and WPS commitments. Data must be gathered on the multidimensional nature of gender and its impacts, as well as the impacts of gender inequality on the VE threat, in order to increase understanding of the importance of gender and improve understanding of the threat, as well as to improve the ability of researchers and policy makers to apply analysis across geographical and ideological contexts.

The intersections of WPS and CT have taken place within the context of exceptional focus on Islamist extremism, due to the fact that the WPS agenda has developed concurrently with international focus on the threat of al-Qaida and then ISIS/Daesh.<sup>17</sup> In the subsequent development of transnational P/CVE approaches, the focus has most often been on how to include women in peace and security solutions. However, in the context of the research on gender within other strands of T/VE, such as the extreme right-wing, there has often been more focus on “toxic masculinities” and male supremacy.<sup>18</sup> Due to the commonly separated response frameworks for these threats, the two areas of gender learning have

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14 Emily Winterbotham, “What can Work (and what has Not Worked) in Women-Centric P/CVE Initiatives: Assessing the Evidence Base for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” *RUSI*, 2020. Accessed at: <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/what-can-work-and-what-has-not-worked-women-centric-pcve-initiatives-assessing-evidence-base>, accessed on: April 12, 2022; Emily Winterbotham, “Do Mothers Know Best? How Assumptions Harm CVE,” *Tony Blair Institute*, 2018. Accessed at: [https://institute.global/policy/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve#:~:text=There%20is%20\(so%20far\)%20no,violent%20extremism%20\(CVE\)%20programming](https://institute.global/policy/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve#:~:text=There%20is%20(so%20far)%20no,violent%20extremism%20(CVE)%20programming), accessed on: April 12, 2022.

15 Ibid.

16 Katherine Brown, “Gender and Counter-Radicalization: Women and Emerging Counter-Terror Measures,” in Margaret Satterthwaite and Jayne Huckerby (eds.), *Gender, National Security, and Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), pp. 36-59; Katherine E. Brown, *Gender, Religion, Extremism: Finding Women in Anti-Radicalization* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2020); Joana Cook, *A Woman’s Place: US Counterterrorism since 9/11* (Oxford University Press, 2020); Jessica White, *Gender Mainstreaming in CT Policy* (Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming 2022).

17 Fiona Ni Aolain, “The ‘war on terror’ and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda,” *International Affairs*, 92(2), pp. 275-291. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12552, (2016).

18 Alex DiBranco, “Mobilizing Misogyny,” *Political Research Associates*, 2017. Available at: <https://www.politicalresearch.org/2017/03/08/mobilizing-misogyny>, accessed on: April 11, 2022; Elizabeth Pearson, “Extremism and Toxic Masculinity: The Man Question Re-Posed,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 6 (November 2019), pp. 1251-1270.

often been siloed.<sup>19</sup> However, better understanding of the complexity of gendered dynamics and the similarities and differences between various forms of T/VE can help ensure that learnings across these contexts can be useful in making CT policy more adaptable.<sup>20</sup>

There has been a more recent push to expand to a more comprehensive gender analysis across extremisms and to account for how gender norms play a significant role for all individuals and how and why they engage with T/VE.<sup>21</sup> Transformative gender mainstreaming strategies are needed to insert gender analysis and perspective into policy and programming and to account for the multidimensional nature of gender and the impact of gender inequality upon T/VE. This necessary added complexity to the work that has begun under the WPS agenda exemplifies the added complexity needed for UN CT frameworks to truly account for the multidimensional nature of T/VE “in all its forms” and thus be more adaptable and transferable across threat contexts.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations emerging from this analysis:

### 1. Increase acknowledgment of the complexity of T/VE.

While international agreement on the threat of Islamist VE has allowed an exceptional expansion of transnational CT response and coordination, to enhance its relevance to other VE threats the UN should increase the consistency and complexity of its conversations around various forms of T/VE. This should include consideration of the wide array of drivers of T/VE such as the gendered socio-economic, political, environmental, and other dynamics that are driving the evolution of the threat spectrum and facilitating the emergence/increase in various ideological motivators of T/VE.

- 19 See the development between “Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism” and “Addendum to the GCTF Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism with a Focus on Mainstreaming Gender” at <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents>.
- 20 Ashley Mattheis and Charlie Winter, “The Greatness of Her Position’: Comparing Identitarian and Jihadi Discourses on Women,” *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)*, 2019. Available at: <https://icsr.info/2019/05/15/the-greatness-of-her-position-comparing-identitarian-and-jihadi-discourses-on-women/>, accessed on: April 27, 2022.
- 21 Alexandra Phelan, Melissa Johnston, and Jacqui True, “Growing Threats of Violent Extremism: The Urgency for a Gender-Based Response,” *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, 8 March 2020. Available at: <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/growing-threats-of-violent-extremism-the-urgency-for-a-gender-based-response/>, accessed on: April 12, 2022.; Jacqui True, et al., “Building an Evidence Base for Empowering Women for Peaceful Communities: A Case Study of Bangladesh and Indonesia,” *UN Women*, 2019. Available at: <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/02/building-an-evidence-base-for-empowering-women-for-peaceful-communities>, accessed on: April 12, 2022; Katherine Brown, Harmonie Toros, and Swati Parashar, “Violent Extremist Myths and Masculinities: Two Country Case Studies,” in Katherine E. Brown, David Duriesmith, Farhana Rahman, and Jacqui True, (eds), *Conflicting Identities: The Nexus between Masculinities, Femininities and Violent Extremism in Asia*, UNDP and UN Women, 2020, pp. 31-52. Available at: <https://www.unwomen.org/digital-library/publications/2020/03/conflicting-identities-the-nexus-between-masculinities-femininities-and-violent-extremism-in-asia>, accessed on: April 12, 2022.

## 2. Encourage learning and analysis across forms of T/VE.

While different ideological and socio-cultural contexts need to remain in focus, the UNSC can support initiatives (including of other UN agencies [e.g., UNCTED or UN Women] etc.) to focus on deconstruction of silos and learning of lessons across studies of different forms of T/VE. For example, the study of “toxic masculinity” more prominent in the extreme right-wing context could help to enrich a wider understanding of gender and its multidimensional impact in other forms of T/VE. Increasing the scope of understanding of “gender” in policy will only enhance its adaptability to current and emerging threats, alongside other intersecting perspectives.

## 3. Recognize that gender does not equal women.

Because of the focus on women stemming from the WPS agenda, many of the gender mainstreaming approaches within P/CVE programming implementation have focused on the role of women and their empowerment in peace and security policy and programming. While the empowerment of women is essential to gender equality, UNSC frameworks must also increase their complexity and further emphasize the multidimensional nature of gender and how gender norm expectations and inequalities impact how and why all individuals engage in T/VE. This could be considered in a Gender, Peace, and Security type of agenda.

## 4. Emphasize that equality is key.

Equality is essential to implementing CT policy and programming that is effective and sustainable. Fundamentally, this requires a re-examination of institutional bias and renewed commitment to improving understanding of the many intersecting inequalities experienced by individuals, including through the gathering of gender data and inclusion of gender perspective in policy and programming.

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