Skip to main content
Home
Subscribe
 
 

Main navigation

  • Projects
  • Publications Publications
    • Browse all
    • What We're Reading
  • Events
  • Network Network
    • Member Organizations
    • The Board
    • Research Advisory Council
  • About Us About Us
    • Updates

Enter the terms you wish to search for.
English French
  • article

    29 April 2022 / Stuart Macdonald, Connor Rees, & Joost S.

    Remove, Impede, Disrupt, Redirect: Understanding & Combating Pro-Islamic State Use of File-Sharing Platforms
    In the face of content takedown and account suspensions on the biggest social media platforms, terrorist groups and their supporters have resorted to the use of file-sharing sites to ensure stable access to their propaganda. Amongst those to have employed this strategy are supporters of the so-called Islamic State (IS). Yet, while studies have repeatedly highlighted the key role that file-sharing platforms play in the dissemination of IS propaganda, there has been little investigation of the strategic considerations that may influence the choice of file-sharing sites from the many available. To address this, this report uses data gathered from 13 public IS Telegram channels over a 45-day period in July - September 2021 to assess three possible strategic considerations: the features offered by different file-sharing sites (such as data storage capacity, maximum upload size, and password file protection); a platform’s enforcement activity; and the ability to generate large banks of URLs quickly and conveniently. Based on these findings, the report proposes a four-pronged strategy to combat the exploitation of file-sharing sites by supporters of IS and other terrorist groups: remove terrorist content at the point of upload; impede the automated generation and dissemination of banks of URLs; disrupt the posting of these URLs on other platforms; and redirect users to other content and support services.   This research was conducted through a secondment scheme hosted at the Cyber Threats Research Centre (CYTREC) at Swansea University. The scheme aimed to create space to form a multi-stakeholder team tasked with looking at the ways terrorist groups exploit the internet and uncover how to respond in a way that respects human rights. The data used to meet this aim came from the Government of Canada-funded, Tech Against Terrorism-created Terrorist Content Analytics Platform (TCAP).  The authors would like to thank HEFCW for funding the secondment scheme via the Research Wales Innovation Fund. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the support received from Tech Against Terrorism, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, Moonshot and Swansea University’s Legal Innovation Lab Wales (which is part-funded by the European Regional Development Fund through the Welsh Government).   Suggested citation: Macdonald, Stuart, Connor Rees, and Joost S. Remove, Impede, Disrupt, Redirect: Understanding & Combating Pro-Islamic State Use of File-Sharing Platforms. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network 2022. https://doi.org/10.37805/ogrr2022.1.
  • article

    20 April 2022 / Ashley A. Mattheis

    Atomwaffen Division and its Affiliates on Telegram: Variations, Practices, and Interconnections
    This research brief details findings from a recent collaborative project exploring different groups related to Atomwaffen Division (AWD) on Telegram. The brief provides an initial foray into understanding the digital communicative practices these AWD-related groups use to maintain their loose structure as a transnational, digitally networked extremist culture. Groups affiliated with the meta-brand of AWD are continuing to develop globally and building a transnational, digital networked culture, despite increased scrutiny. This indicates that their structure as a digitally networked, transnational culture provides resilience to traditional policy and law enforcement approaches. Addressing this threat requires insight into the practices that such groups use to interconnect their now multi-nodal, supranational organization. This research was conducted through a secondment scheme hosted at the Cyber Threats Research Centre (CYTREC) at Swansea University. The project was supported by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED) and Tech Against Terrorism (TAT). The secondment aimed to create space to form a multi-stakeholder team tasked with looking at the ways terrorist groups exploit the internet and uncover how to respond in a way that respects human rights. The data used to meet this aim came from the Government of Canada-funded, TAT-created Terrorist Content Analytics Platform (TCAP).   Suggested citation:  Mattheis, Ashley A. Atomwaffen Division and its Affiliates on Telegram: Variations, Practices, and Interconnections. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2022. https://doi.org/10.37805/remve2022.1.
  • article

    31 March 2022 / Cameron Sumpter and Yuslikha K. Wardhani

    Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia’s National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism
    This policy note outlines the key details of Indonesia’s National Action Plan for P/CVE before discussing the evident challenges and opportunities moving forward. The ambitious strategy (known by its Indonesian acronym, RAN PE) could decentralize P/CVE programming in Indonesia, facilitate the formalization of working relationships between civil society organizations and local government authorities, mainstream gender perspectives, and streamline activities to improve targeting and avoid overlap. But constructive outcomes will depend on overcoming thorny obstacles, such as coordinating the varied interests, motivations, and capacities of the many stakeholders involved, and allaying concerns over applicable definitions that some perceive as overly broad and possibly divisive.   Suggested citation:  Sumpter, Cameron, and Yuslikha K. Wardhani. Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia’s National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2022. https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2022.2.sea.   
  • article

    24 March 2022 / Miryam Eser Davolio

    Research on Islamist Extremism in the Swiss Context: Assessing and Analyzing a Sensitive Phenomenon
    Researching and addressing “radicalization” within smaller European countries is particularly challenging. Not only is it incumbent that research and approaches take into account analyses, findings, strategies, and measures from other contexts, they must also work to craft their own national understanding of the extent and nature of the phenomena and approaches to address it. This chapter discusses the author’s reflections on experiences conducting two studies on violent jihadist radicalization in Switzerland at a time of heightened concern over potential jihadist violent extremist threats. In doing so, the chapter focuses on the ethical and methodological challenges specific to the Swiss context, as well as issues impacting research on violent extremism more generally. The two studies— both of which the author served a role in—additionally navigated the tension inherent in researching a topic of heightened public interest and media coverage.   Suggested citation:  Eser Davolio, Miryam. Research on Islamist Extremism in the Swiss Context: Assessing and Analyzing a Sensitive Phenomenon. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2022. https://doi.org/10.37805/rve2022.1. 
Tweets by resolvenet
  • Policy Notes
    Jakana Thomas
    |
    01 February 2022
    Gendered Security Sector Reform: What Can We Learn from Women’s Participation in...
    West African women are frequently absent from discussions of community security, despite their substantial contributions to local defense. Women are often viewed primarily as beneficiaries of attempts to reduce local violence, such that their roles in community-based security are typically overlooked. Yet women’s participation in CBAGs holds important implications for the national security of conflict-affected states. Understanding women’s participation in community-based armed groups matters for successful demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs and for states’ implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security agenda, particularly gendered security sector reform. That women have been active—and in some cases instrumental— in establishing and maintaining local security can serve as a point of reference for states seeking to integrate more women into security institutions. Moreover, since CBAG politics are often governed by local norms and practices, understanding how women have become integrated into these local security structures can suggest means of achieving gendered security sector reform that are consistent with and respectful of local customs. This policy note briefly outlines and expounds upon some of the main insights of the author’s recent RESOLVE research report on women’s participation in West African CBAGs. It proposes a set of considerations for states and stakeholders to structure efforts around gendered security sector reform.    Suggested citation: Thomas, Jakana. Gendered Security Sector Reform: What Can We Learn from Women’s Participation in Community-Based Armed Groups?. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2022. https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2022.1.cbags. 
              
  • Research Report
    Charlie Winter, Abdul Sayed, and Abdullah Alrhmoun
    |
    27 January 2022
    A “New” Islamic Emirate? The Taliban’s Outreach Strategy in the Aftermath of Kab...
    As the Taliban’s forces swept across Afghanistan in July and August, their triumphalist—and fundamentally revolutionary—discourse became exponentially more pronounced. The moment it seized Kabul, however, the Taliban had to reorder its communications priorities. As Afghanistan’s new de facto government, it needed to expand on what its outreach strategists had been doing to date, i.e., setting out political aspirations, emphasizing military capabilities, and attacking the legitimacy of adversaries. Now, it had to take on a more complex strategic communications task: demonstrating that its new state would be able to follow through on what as a movement it had been promising for decades. Drawing on tens of thousands of data points ingested by ExTrac’s automated crawlers from the Taliban’s online networks on Telegram and Twitter as well as an array of pro-Taliban static websites, this report examines how the fall of Kabul impacted the Taliban’s outreach strategy.    Suggested citation:  Winter, Charlie, Abdul Sayed, and Abdullah Alrhmoun. A “New” Islamic Emirate? The Taliban’s Outreach Strategy in the Aftermath of Kabul. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, ExTrac, 2022. https://10.37805/ogrr2022.1.afg. 
              
  • Research Report
    William Maley
    |
    17 December 2021
    Research as an Outsider: Positionality, Ethics, and Risk
    Outsiders—or “foreigners”—who study violent extremism in affected countries can have multiple identities as students of violent extremism, as students of the countries in question, and as “foreigners” to the contexts they study. They often have long-standing personal relationships with local community members and in some cases they have spent more time living in the countries they study than in their countries of nationality. Yet they inhabit an ambiguous space, being “insiders” in the eyes of some, and “outsiders” in the eyes of others. This ambiguity gives rise to both practical and ethical challenges in undertaking fieldwork. The following reflections draw on the author’s own experiences to illustrate some of the complexities associated with positionality, ethics, and risk as well as important considerations that all researchers should take into account when undertaking fieldwork in a country other than their own.   Suggested citation:  Maley, William. Research as an Outsider: Positionality, Ethics, and Risk. Washington, D.C.: RESOLVE Network, 2021. https://doi.org/10.37805/rve2021.7. 
              

Welcome to the Resolve Network

LEARN MORE ABOUT US
Better research. Informed practice. Improved policy on violent extrimism.
Resolve Network Map
Publication Categories
VIEW ALL PUBLICATIONS
Research Reports
Research Briefs
Factsheets
Compendiums
Policy Notes
WHAT WE'RE READING

RESOLVE Network

ISSN 2766-9955

RESOLVE is housed at the U.S. Institute of Peace, building upon the Institute’s decades-long legacy of deep engagement in conflict-affected societies.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: +1.202.457.1700

  • About Us
  • Contact Us
  • Newsletter Archive
 
 

          

© RESOLVE Network 2021. All Rights Reserved | Terms and Conditions